Mandamus in Election Action by Focht, Thomas H.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 1 | Issue 1 Article 12
Mandamus in Election Action
Thomas H. Focht
Copyright c 1957 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Thomas H. Focht, Mandamus in Election Action, 1 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 107 (1957),
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol1/iss1/12
2) He had failed to provide her with sufficient clothes;
3) He was consorting with a woman not his wife;
4) He would stay away from home at nights, often without
the wife's knowledge of his whereabouts;
5) He had suggested that he would procure men for her for
prostitution purposes, which under subsection 5, section
18-255, Code of Virginia of 1950, was contempt since
adultery is a crime in Virginia (and such a suggestion
would be clearly considered as an interference with his
wife's probation); and,
6) He had told her that he was tired of supporting her and
had made the prostitution suggestion as a possible means
for her self-support.
The trial court below held that these matters were full and com-
plete and would support the conviction for contempt. Had some
third party, knowing of the wife's probation, 5 solicited her for a
career in prostitution, he could be held in contempt. Yet the
Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, finding these
evidentiary details insufficient.
It is submitted that the trial court had authority both in-
herently and in accordance with section 18-255(5), Code of Vir-
ginia 1950, to punish summarily any person for disobedience of a
court order, and that it was correct in its application of the law to
the facts. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, by its ex-
tensive reliance upon statutes inapplicable to the facts and issues
presented, was not responsive to those issues and has erroneously
reversed the correct result reached by the trial court.
S. J. B.
PROCEDURE-MANDAMUS IN ELECTION
ACTION
In two recent cases' the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
has decided that a writ of mandamus will not lie to order election
5 Calamos v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 397, 71 S.E.2d 159 (1945).
Hall v. Stuart, 198 Va. 315, 94 S.E.2d 284 (1956); Whited v. Fugate et.
al., 198 Va. 328, 94 S.E.2d 292 (1956).
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judges and clerks of a precinct to appear and to count certain
disputed mail ballots in a county election, but that mandamus will
lie to compel the commissioners of elections to declare the results
and to make the proper certification.
The case of Hall v. Stuart arose after the election of November
8, 1955, when it appeared that one of the candidates lost to his op-
ponent by one vote. This made a dispute which had arisen among
the election judges and clerks in Dorton precinct in Russell County
particularly important. The dispute concerned the validity of
thirty-two mail ballots.
After a one and one-half hour disagreement, the judges de-
cided to set aside the disputed ballots and have the Commissioners
of Election pass on their validity. The existence of such an
agreement was the subject of conflicting testimony in court, but
even if such an agreement had been reached, it would have been
illegal and ineffective. The Court of Appeals stated that the duties
of the Commissioners of Election are "to take the return as made
to them from the different voting precincts, add them up, and de-
clare the result. Questions of illegal voting and fraudulent practices
are to be passed upon by another tribunal." 2
The losing candidates for offices in the election went into the
Circuit Court of Russell County and requested a writ of mandamus
to compel the judges and clerks to complete the counting of the
thirty-two disputed ballots. The Circuit Court granted mandamus,
but on appeal was reversed by the Supreme Court.
The petitioners (for the writ of mandamus) relied heavily on
the case of Moore v. Pullem,3 which held that the judges of election
at a precinct could be compelled by mandamus to discharge the
mandatory ministerial duty of counting such of the ballots cast
under the absent voter's act as had been deposited by legal voters.
However, the Supreme Court did not agree with this argument,
but insisted that "that case presented a different situation .... "4 The
court distinguished the cases on two grounds: 1) In Moore v.
Pullem, the judges had refused to count any of the mail ballots
2 Lewis v. Commissioners of Marshall County, 16 Kan. 102, 108, 22 Am.Rep.
275, 279 (1876).
3 150 Va. 174, 142 S.E. 415 (1928).
4 Hall v Stuart, 198 Va. at 326, 94 S.E.2d at 291 (1956).
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rather than just disputed mail ballots; and, 2) The petition for man-
damus in Moore v. Pullem was promptly filed before the general
results were tabulated. These distinctions, especially the first, seem
to be reasonable, as there is certainly a difference between a refusal
to count any of the mail ballots and a failure to count only those
mail ballots which are disputed by the judges and clerks.
With the case of Moore v. Pullem clearly distinguished, the
Supreme Court continued and, following a well-defined practice,
refused to grant the extraordinary legal writ of mandamus unless
the petitioners could prove, to the satisfaction of the court, their
need for it. Since mandamus is an extraordinary legal remedy, it
would seem that the Supreme Court needed only one basis for re-
fusing to grant it, but in this case, the court stated two reasons for
its refusal to grant the writ: 1) the act involved the exercise of
judgment and discretion, and 2) mandamus will not lie when the
party requesting it has another adequate remedy.
The court's first basis for refusal of this writ is clearly based
on the assumption that this writ was directed at a discretionary act.
The court stated:
. . . the judges of the election would thereby be compelled
to perform a task ... which involves the exercise of judg-
ment and discretion, not a mere ministerial act within the
ordinary function of a writ of mandamus.5
If this were actually an act of discretion, there would be no dispute
of the court's determination here, as all authorities agree that man-
damus will never lie to compel a discretionary act. But was this writ
of mandamus sought to command the performance of an act of dis-
cretion or was it rather to command the judges to complete the
ministerial duty of exercising their discretion?
It would seem that this writ was directed at the ministerial act
of exercising discretion. In the case of Lewis v. Christian,6 decided
in 1903, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held that a duty
does not become less ministerial because the officer must determine
the existence of certain facts which make it necessary for him to
act, and mandamus is the proper remedy to enforce the perform-
ance of such a duty. Thus, in applying the court's holding to the
5 Ibid.
6 101 Va. 135, 43 S.E. 331 (1903).
present case, it could be argued that the duty of the judges and
clerks did not become less ministerial because they had to determine
the validity of the mail ballots before they counted them. On the
basis of this 1903 case, it seems possible that the Supreme Court
could have held this was a ministerial rather than a discretionary
act.
The second reason for the court's refusal to grant mandamus
seems more justifiable to this writer. An examination of the Code of
Virginia reveals the remedy available to the petitioners. Sections
24-430 et. seq. of the Code provide that the returns of an election
of this type shall be subject to review and inquiry by a three judge
court on the complaint of fifteen or more qualified voters. The Code
further provides for the filing and service of the complaint, filing
of a counter complaint, taking of depositions, costs, etc. It would
seem that most authorities7 would agree with the court when it
said:
. . . where there is a statutory remedy not only plain and
adequate, but by its terms applicable to the situation,
and affording a method of settling the dispute according
to the principles of justice and right, the extraordinary
remedy of mandamus should not be used."
However, it should be pointed out that there are very good
arguments on the other side of this question, and it seems quite
possible that the Supreme Court could have justified reaching an
opposite result in determining this issue. Was this statutory remedy
so "plain and adequate" for the appellees that it would justify the
refusal of mandamus? In their brief, counsel for the appellees
stated, "That the burden of contesting the election ... is a more
elaborate and extensive, and more expensive proceeding (than
bringing the action for mandamus)." Unfortunately, this state-
ment was not expanded or explained in their brief, but it seems
very possible that the Supreme Court, if they had wanted to do
so, could have expanded on this argument and followed it.
The fact that the ten day period 9 in which an action can be
brought under the Code provisions had already run on the appellees
7 55 C.J.S. §17, p. 41. See Dovel v. Bertram, 184 Va. 19, 34 S.E.2d 369
(1945); Powell v. Smith, 152 Va. 209, 146 S.E. 196 (1929).
8 198 Va. at 325, 94 S.E.2d at 291.
9 Va. Code §24-430 (1950).
would probably not affect the outcome of this case in any way.
The appellees apparently attempted to have the court direct its
attention to one narrow issue in this election-the counting of the
thirty-two mail ballots. The court, however, chose to ignore the
appellee's narrow issue and seems to say that, in order to accom-
plish their purpose, the appellees should have contested the elec-
tion according to the Code procedure.
In the same day that the decision of Hall v. Stuart was handed
down, the Supreme Court also rendered its decision in the case of
Whited v. Fugate. In this companion case the winning candidate
in the election sought writ of mandamus to compel the commis-
sioners of election to perform their ministerial duties of declaring
the results and of making the proper certification, notwithstanding
the fact that such certification would have to be made without
consideration of the thirty-two contested ballots discussed in the
former case.
Here the Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus.
This decision seems to be in keeping with the practice of granting
the writ when it is directed at a purely ministerial matter for
which no other adequate remedy exists. The court's comment in
Moore v. Pullem, supra, seems very applicable in this case also:
It cannot be fairly questioned that when public officials
charged with a ministerial duty fail to perform it at the
time required by law, they can be compelled by man-
damus to discharge such duty as soon thereafter as is
possible. The neglect of such a duty at the right time does
not relieve those at fault from its subsequent performance,
if this is essential to preserve substantive rights.'"
It appears that the case of Hall v. Stuart, supra, could have
been decided either way by the court. This writer takes issue with
the court's position on the question of whether this is a ministerial
or discretionary duty. Although there are some authorities" in
support of the court's determination, they are not from this juris-
diction, and if the case' 2 from this jurisdiction had been applied,
the opposite result might have easily been reached by the court.
10 150 Va. at 198, 142 S.E. at 422.
11 People ex rel. Griffith v. Bundy, 107 Colo. 102, 109 P.2d 261 (1941);
In re Validation of Bonds of McNeill Special Consolidated School Dis-
trict, 331 Mo. 1006, 56 S.W.2d 67 (1932).
12 See Note 6, supra.
Turning to the determination of the existence of another
adequate remedy for the appellees, it seems that this was clearly
a question for the court which had not been previously determined.
The court reached a result which this writer believes it can justify;
however, it seems reasonable to say that the court might have
reached the opposite result and justified it by an expansion and
more thorough examination of the appellee's argument that the
statutory remedy was not adequate for this situation.
In the case of Whited v. Fugate, supra, we seem to have a
clear case for the application of a writ of mandamus. Here the
court said: "For the reasons stated in the case of Hall v. Stuart,
supra, . . . the petition . . . for a mandamus should have been
granted," and with no further discussion granted the mandamus.
This would certainly lead one to believe that the court is implying
that here is a "clear" situation for the application of mandamus.
These two cases seem to help clarify the court's position on the
granting of mandamus. The first case seemed to come close to
justifying a need for mandamus, but the argument for it was not
strong enough for the Supreme Court. The second case presented
a need, sufficiently strong, to have the court grant the writ.
T. H.F.
PROCEDURE-RULE 3:21
In a recent case,' the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has
interpreted for the first time Rule 3:21 of the Rules of Court. The
interpretation made by the Court was one of a most restrictive
nature and, judging from the facts of the case, may have thwarted
justice. It is true that the Rule was given a definitive interpretation,
but the binding analysis, as fixed by the Court, was not warranted
in the face of the liberal policy which is the trend in this country
whenever procedural problems are involved. Rather than proceed
under this modem view, the highest Court in Virginia has chosen
instead to remain with the conservative element.
In the present case, which arose from an automobile accident,
the final judgment was pronounced and entered on March 17,
'Harvey v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 198 Va. 213, 93 S.E.2d
309 (1956).
